IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND 2 3 4 22-CV-246-JJM 5 OCEAN STATE TACTICAL, LLC, et al 6 VS. NOVEMBER 3, 2022 7 STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, 8 et al \* PROVIDENCE, RI 9 10 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN J. McCONNELL, JR. CHIEF JUDGE 13 Courtroom 1 14 (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order)) 15 16 **APPEARANCES:** 17 FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MICHAEL A. KELLY, ESQ. 18 DANE EVAN ARDENTE Kelly, Souza, Rocha & Parmenter 128 Dorrance Street, Ste 300 19 Providence, RI 02903 20 SARAH RICE, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT: 21 RI Department of Attorney General 22 150 South Main Street Providence, RI 02903 23 Denise P. Veitch, RPR Court Reporter: 24 One Exchange Terrace Providence, RI 02903 25

3 NOVEMBER 2022 -- 2:00 P.M.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. We're here on Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in the case of Ocean State Tactical, LLC, et al v. The State of Rhode Island, criminal action 22 -- I'm sorry -- civil action 22-246. Would counsel identify themselves for the record, please.

MR. KELLY: Michael Kelly for the Plaintiffs, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Kelly.

MR. KELLY: Good afternoon.

MR. ARDENTE: Dane Ardente for the Plaintiffs, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Ardente.

MS. RICE: Sarah Rice, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Defendants.

MR. HOFFMAN: Keith Hoffman, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Defendants.

THE COURT: Great. Welcome, all.

Mr. Kelly, it's your motion. And while you're coming up, I've told counsel this, for those watching, we're limiting arguments to no more than 45 minutes, either side. Split, if you want to split it or not, it's all up to you. We're going to stay very strict to

that because an hour and a half is as long as our court reporter can go in any one sitting.

So, Mr. Kelly, the floor is yours.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, were you tested before you came in?

> MR. KELLY: Yes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And I assume it was negative.

MR. KELLY: Yes.

THE COURT: So you're welcome to take your mask off if you were vaccinated and tested.

> MR. KELLY: Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: How are you?

MR. KELLY: Michael Kelly for the Plaintiff.

And I'm sure you're well aware of the issue before the Court, and that is whether or not the so-called magazine ban enacted by the Legislature in July of this year violates the Second Amendment and/or the Fifth Amendment which applies to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment. And it's been the subject, this issue has been the subject, as I'm sure you know from reading the briefs of extensive litigation, and there were approximately seven or eight pending cases before the Supreme Court of the United States at the time it decided the Bruen case, which has changed the landscape

in regard to the analysis of the Second Amendment, and making it a historical review as opposed to other of the second step which was applied in the *Heller* and other cases as to whether or not the so-called firearm in fact was protected and were there public reasons for such an enactment.

Now, the statute itself provides that as of

December 18th that the -- I'm going to call them

large-capacity magazines, and that's over 10 rounds,

and I'm going to be referring to standard-capacity

magazines as those that are issued with the gun.

Typically when you buy a firearm it comes, of course,

with a magazine. That's the only way you can shoot it.

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, can you help me on that because I was looking at this earlier. Are there guns that are manufactured that have an in-place magazine capacity in excess of 10?

MR. KELLY: Most guns these days have magazines that exceed 10.

THE COURT: Okay. But is the magazine a permanent part of the gun, or is it a replaceable cartridge, so to speak?

MR. KELLY: If I may, your Honor.

THE COURT: I was kind of queueing up your show-and-tell.

MR. KELLY: It's not much of a show-and-tell, but if I may --

THE COURT: First of all, have you shared it with the State's counsel?

MR. KELLY: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly was kind enough to check with us and Marshals Service before he brought this in, which we appreciate.

MR. KELLY: The magazine such as that which are made of plastic, at this time most of these type of magazines, that's for an AR-15, are plastic, and which, as you'll hear, presents quite a problem in terms of how you permanently modify a plastic magazine. But there are, as you'll hear and as I'll present through some affidavits, most guns these days come with a magazine that exceeds 10 rounds, and there are several if not many firearms where there is no available magazine of 10 rounds or less. Either they're not made or you cannot obtain them at this time, which gets to the issue of whether it's a firearm, which I will address in detail later on.

So it has to be either permanently modified. As you know, there are no regulations, criteria whatsoever in regard to what "permanently modified" actually means; or it can surrender the magazine, one can

surrender magazines to the police department or transfer to a federally-licensed firearm dealer. That is the extent of what has to be done with these magazines. As you can see, the fact that there are many that are in fact plastic presents quite a problem, particularly with no criteria whatsoever.

THE COURT: Well, as to that aspect, I mea, there's other options that the owner has; right? Modifying is one of them, sending it to a licensed dealer, sending it to, turning it in to the authorities, so it is --

MR. KELLY: Yes, your Honor. Excuse me. And we presented some affidavits as to why those options frankly not options at this point. I'm sure you well know what the standard is for this type of relief, preliminary injunction, which is likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and balancing of the hardships. Excuse me.

Now, prior to the *Bruen* case there was a two-step analysis of whether a firearm in fact was protected by the Second Amendment, and the criteria used was established as a challenge that law regulation regulates activity falling outside the scope. If it fell beyond the scope it was categorically unprotected. However, in the Walberg (indecipherable) right, in the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Second Amendment there was a strict scrutiny test in which basically it was narrowly tailored to compel, to serve a compelling government interest, and there was also intermediate scrutiny as to whether the government could show the law was substantially upgraded to the achievement of an important government interest. Bruen changed all of that. Bruen indicated that the courts have gone one step too far. If it's a regulation that's inconsistent with the plain text of the Second Amendment, it impermissibly burdens the Second Amendment after historical analysis as to whether the firearm was previously regulated in the Founding Era, which is when the Second Amendment was, in fact, adopted. However, no matter what the regulation is, it cannot overcome the plain text of the Second Amendment.

THE COURT: So Mr. Kelly, let's stop right there, and it seems to me that the issue of the plain text analysis is where we begin, the court tells us, the *Bruen* court tells us, and it seems to me the singular issue there for our analysis for purposes of this case is a magazine an arm or is it an accoutrement, an accessory; and assuming that you agree with me that that's kind of the first level of the textual analysis, what is the Plaintiff's position as

to the distinction between an arm and an accoutrement and why is it your position that a magazine is an arm textually?

MR. KELLY: I would just quote the Supreme Court case of Jackson where the Supreme Court indicated through Judge Thomas quoting that case, (Reading) Without bullets, the right to bear arms would be meaningless and indeed a regulation eliminating a person's ability to obtain or use ammunition would thereby make it impossible to use their firearms for their core purpose.

Now, there was at the time of the *Bruen* decision over six cases pending before the court had come up from the various circuit courts and that challenged the possession of large-capacity magazines, and, in fact, in each of those cases the courts had done the analysis in regard to whether it was protected by the Second Amendment and therefore all those cases reviewed the Second Amendment and the magazine as if it were a firearm based upon the fact that without the magazine the gun can't be shot and the fact that you have to have bullets, obviously, to shoot the gun; and those were the *Duncan* and *Barton* case, the *Association of Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. Bruck*, the *Kolbe v. Hogan* case, *Friedman v. City of Highland Park*,

Bianchi v. Frosh, and Young v. Hawaii. So in all those cases both the district court and the courts of appeals held that it was, that the magazine was in fact a firearm and did the analysis in regard to whether the magazine was protected by the Second Amendment.

THE COURT: Those cases didn't determine that.

They accepted the argument as part of the legal argument that the magazine was subject to the arms textual analysis. They didn't hold after a hearing that a magazine is an arm, did they? I mean that's my understanding of what --

(Overlapping speech)

MR. KELLY: They didn't specifically hold that clearly as you just enunciated, but they analyzed it under the Second Amendment. It seems to me, just as we've done today, the first step is to determine whether it's a firearm before you even get to the fact as to whether it's protected.

THE COURT: Sure. So define for me the definition, give me the definition of arm that includes magazine, according to the Plaintiff. How does one use that, how does one interpret that word "arm" when determining between an accoutrement and an arm?

MR. KELLY: Well, my response to that is that the magazines are provided; they are part of the gun as

modern instruments at this point. The Rhode Island statute also defines, and I've got that right here. There it is; thank you. So Rhode Island has its own statute in which they have defined -- excuse me. The case in *Bruen* included all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of Founding, and the Second Amendment's definition of arms is fixed according to its historical understanding the general definition covers modern instruments.

THE COURT: Say that one more time. It covers -- what did you say?

MR. KELLY: The Second Amendment's definition of arms is fixed according to its historical understanding that general definition covers modern instruments to facilitate armed self-defense, citing the *Caetano* case from Massachusetts.

THE COURT: But no one has given us guidance, that I've seen, either the First Circuit or the Supreme Court, on how one determines what is an arm versus what is an accourtement. Because you would agree with me that it's a distinction with a difference; right? That arms falls under the Second Amendment; accourtements or accessories, depending upon what century you live in, don't; right? You agree with that distinction?

MR. KELLY: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So what's the definition of arms that we should use to determine whether an item like that is an accessory or not? In other words the analogy is, you know, you have a car, that's a car, and then you might have a rooftop on top of it. Is the rooftop, is the luggage carrier a car, or is it an accessory to the car? So how do I determine which it is?

MR. KELLY: Well, I would just go back to the definition used in *Bruen*. The modern instrument as defined as -- covers, Second Amendment, modern instruments to facilitate armed self-defense. As I previous stated and as set forth in our affidavit from Mr. Worthy and others, the magazine in fact is necessary to fire the gun and in fact it therefore facilitates the arm of self-defense.

In addition, the Rhode Island General Laws

Title 11 Chapter 47 titled Weapons very strongly
implies that magazines are weapons and regulates them
as weapons. It refers to chapter -- Section 51, Loaded
Weapons in a Vehicle, it indicates that it is unlawful
for any person to have in his or her possession a
loaded rifle or loaded shotgun or rife or shotgun from
the magazine of which all shells and cartridges have

not been removed.

So the magazine in that statute is indicated to be a part of the weapon due to the fact that it cannot have any shells in the magazine or it's considered a loaded weapon. It also goes on to, it says that other objects separately from the weapon or firearm, in fact, are covered as weapons. So I believe that that statute, common sense reading, indicates that the state statute considers the magazine part of the gun.

And as I said, the courts have all reviewed the magazines to determine whether or not under the Second Amendment whether they're covered.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Kelly, let's flip to the second preliminary question which you raised in one of your quotes, which is, do you agree that the Second Amendment only applies to arms used in self-defense?

MR. KELLY: No, I don't, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Tell me why Heller and Bruen don't so hold.

MR. KELLY: Well, one of the cases, in fact, addresses that issue, and I don't have it right in front of me, but basically the court indicated that it is not just limited to self-defense, but includes sporting and other shooting activities; and, in fact, target shooting is at page 7 of the report that we

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

filed from Ashley Hlebinsky which indicates that target shooting was part of American culture before the formation of the United States with colonists taking part in competitions known as rifle frolics, frolics, and this in fact took place back in the Founding Era and also increased in the post-Civil War.

THE COURT: But Mr. Kelly, even now -- or feel free to send me a, you know, letter brief afterwards and show me -- but I was under the impression having read all of the cases that the Supreme Court was rather clear in its limitation on the extent of the Second Amendment to arms for purposes of self-defense. was the basis of *Heller* and it was incorporated into the Bruen case. So if you have a Supreme Court case that says that the Second Amendment applies to weapons outside of for use of self-defense, then I need to know that because that's not my understanding of what they require for the analysis. Again, if you don't have it now feel free to let me know later. But that's the analysis that I am working under and what the Supreme Court requires us to do initially before we even get to the Second Amendment analysis of the historic tradition.

MR. KELLY: Very good, your Honor, I will.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. KELLY: Getting to the analysis under the historic investigation which the *Bruen* court in fact has indicated is the test to be done, pursuant to our report from Ashley Hlebinsky there were none at the time of the Founding Era. There was no regulations concerning the number of bullets that a gun could in fact hold and in fact at that time there were requirements according to the government that each person or able-bodied man, so to speak, be required to carry a musket and a certain amount of rounds for ammunition with him at all times.

THE COURT: Can I just back us up, Mr. Kelly, on this because another perplexing part of the Supreme Court's analysis in *Bruen* or the Supreme Court's mandate to district courts and courts of appeal has to do with how do you determine this historic tradition, and it may be one thing if you could look at history and see it's either red or blue and make a determination, but there's clearly analysis that goes into that, and we can see that by competing historical affidavits that say directly opposite things about our history.

So my first question to you is what advice do you have under the *Bruen* required analysis on this historic tradition? How does the Court make that

determination between competing, potentially competing pieces of evidence? You've chosen, you both -- you all have chosen to present it by way of affidavit which I think is the efficient way to look at it, but how am I to determine who is right on these two affidavits, two competing affidavits?

MR. KELLY: A close reading of the Defendant's affidavit in regard to that issue will indicate that there were no regulations in effect in the Founding Era for the number of rounds of ammunition that any type of weapon could in fact hold.

THE COURT: Right. But the State's affidavit says that as of at least into the 1700s there were no firearm, there were no arms that required -- that allowed multiple shootings without reloading, so one would be -- if you follow the State's expert, one wouldn't be surprised that there's no regulation prohibiting that which doesn't exist.

MR. KELLY: That is not the case, your Honor.

THE COURT: I know, but I just want to get to my initial question, and I won't beat a dead horse here, but how am I to determine, how am I supposed to determine under this new *Bruen* mandate between competing affidavits? You know, Judge Carlton Reed down in Mississippi yesterday, a couple of days ago

issued an opinion on this very issue, talking about the difficulty that district courts will have under the Bruen mandated analysis and it was actually looking at appointing a court expert to come to that determination. Is there a way -- am I to judge credibility between the affidavits and, if so, how?

MR. KELLY: Let me suggest this, your Honor, if I may. At page 10 of our expert's report she cites several examples of so-called repeaters that were in effect as early as the 1750s that at least one was a 12-shot repeater made by gunmaker John Shaw in Boston; and then there was two or three others that have been mentioned here, the Belton rifle, which actually a hundred of those were ordered by George Washington for the Continental Army, and then a few decades later, around 1779 an air rifle was developed which held 22-rounds from a tubular magazine, and that was actually used by Lewis and Clark in their expedition.

I think it would be very easy for the Court to determine if in fact those were in effect by checking -- that those were in existence by checking the citations that were given. One of them is an advertisement in a newspaper and others are reported in the newspaper also. And I believe they're well documented, your Honor, and I think that's the way for

one to check to see which expert is in fact addressing that issue accurately; and that is, were there magazines or guns which held more than 10 rounds -- and that's an arbitrary figure, your Honor, of course, some states are eight, some are 10, some are 12 -- and whether or not those guns were in existence. There certainly were no regulations at the time. And I don't believe that the Defendant's expert pointed to one regulation that limited in the Founding Era the number of rounds of ammunition that was restricted for a firearm.

THE COURT: Do you think that the state can constitutionally impose any amount of limitation on a magazine, or does it have to be unlimited to meet constitutional muster? What if it were 20 or 30?

MR. KELLY: Yes, I think that they have a problem regulating these magazines based upon historical analysis because in fact, as I've just said, there were about four or five guns in existence in the Founding Era, 1750s through 1770s that in fact held more than 10 rounds. Some held up to -- the Giardoni rifle which I mentioned held 22 rounds.

THE COURT: The State's expert says that except for weapons of war -- that they were, that multiple round arms at that period was an uncommon weapon of

war, as opposed to for public use.

MR. KELLY: Obviously -- I do not believe there were any actual citations to that reference and, as I've indicated, there were multiple rifles available in that time period which had more than 10, more than 12 rounds of ammunition. And there were no regulations. They don't point to a regulation. So I think that the Court could easily determine the issue by checking to see whether or not the citations and the sources here that we've cited at page 10 of our report in fact are correct, and I believe that they would be easily documented.

George Washington wrote a letter in 1776 asking that the Continental Congress order a hundred Belton rifles. 1779, the Girardoni was created. To my knowledge there wasn't a war going on at that point. And, as I said, it was used by Lewis and Clark on their expedition, certainly not a war.

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, under your client's analysis, could the State ban machine guns?

MR. KELLY: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Could they prohibit machine guns?

MR. KELLY: Yes, because that's a completely different animal than we're talking about. Machine guns are different because they're automatic. You pull

the trigger once and it keeps firing until it's out of ammunition. The large-capacity magazines that we're talking about are used in semi-automatics which you have to pull a trigger each time.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KELLY: And to tell you the truth, I'm a shooter; there are many individuals that can change that magazine in a matter of two or three seconds. So I would suggest that the difference between that type of conduct and having 20 bullets in a magazine is not that different.

THE COURT: Well, the evidence in common logic tells us the two or three seconds could save two or three children in a crowded classroom.

MR. KELLY: That's speculation.

THE COURT: It's common sense. It takes a couple of seconds at a minimum to reload. The chance that a child can run or duck or hide, I think I could almost take judicial notice of that as a fact.

MR. KELLY: I stand by my statement, but I understand, I understand the issue, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KELLY: And under this historical analysis the regulation or the law that one would be pointing to as a basis for a regulation, it's got to be relevantly

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

similar, which is evaluated under two metrics; and that is, the regulation burdens law-abiding citizens have the right to armed defense, and then there's the whether modern and historical regulations impose comparable burdens in the right to armed defense -- which here there are none, in our opinion -- why the regulation burdens law-abiding citizens the right to armed defense and whether that is comparably justified.

There's been a conflict between some of the scholars trying to compare later day regulations such as the one you just referred to on machine guns, which were not enacted until the 20s when we had quite a few gangsters around the country using these machine guns. And if you look at the National Firearms Act which regulates machine guns, it does not limit capacity. Ιn other words whether it's a machine gun or not is not dependant on the number of rounds of ammunition that it can hold; it's on the firing mechanism which is automatic, which certainly is something that's far different than a semi-automatic or a pistol, et cetera. Actually pistols these days come with almost like a magazine, you pop the area which, the round cylinder which holds the bullets, the whole thing pops out, you So the technology has moved along. And as pop one in. the scholars have all agreed, but that doesn't mean

that these magazines using the new technology, guns using new technology are not covered.

As I said, the Founding Era there were several guns in existence which held more than 10, 12 rounds, and I've given you several examples of those. I won't repeat myself. There was --

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, can I interrupt for a second again and go back to the machine gun analogy, and I understand the difference between a machine gun and a semi-automatic -- that's the difference in terms of whether a bullet gets sent out or not. But why is that a distinction that matters for constitutional analysis? What is it about the trigger that makes it okay to -- or the lack of trigger that makes it okay to regulate, but the trigger itself is regulatable?

MR. KELLY: Because it shoots much faster. A machine gun shoots much faster. As I said, it's automatic.

THE COURT: So the State can regulate arms if they shoot bullets too fast?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think that the analysis for the machine guns is it a dangerous and unusual weapon; and obviously the statutes that regulate those type of arms, they were intended to prevent the, having an automatic weapon that could continuously fire. And

as I said, the statutes, the National Firearms Act does 1 2 not focus on capacity, so capacity is not part of the 3 definition of machine gun. It's the type, how it can 4 shoot. 5 THE COURT: But again I don't want to Right. beat a dead horse, but so what for constitutional 6 7 analysis, and why is that part of the legal analysis? 8 Why is that a legal distinction that has any relevance 9 to what the Bruen court tells us we should be looking 10 at? 11 MR. KELLY: Because it's an unusual and 12 dangerous weapon, even if --13 THE COURT: Because it expels bullets fast. 14 MR. KELLY: Much faster than a semi-automatic, 15 yes. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So the constitutionality 17 turns on the degree of speed of the bullet? 18 MR. KELLY: No, it --19 I'm just trying -- I'm not trying to THE COURT: 20 give you a hard time, Mr. Kelly, honest. I'm trying to 21 figure out legally as we analyze this, it's very 22 complicated and there's not a lot of direction because 23 the Supreme Court just came down with this, --24 MR. KELLY: I agree. 25 THE COURT: -- so I'm trying to figure out where this all fits into a legal analysis appropriately, and the part, that part I just can't get my head around, where it belongs, one way or the other how it goes. You know what, I don't want to take up all of your -- you only have about 10 minutes left, so I'm assuming you want to talk about the takings clause because that intrigues me as well. I don't know if there's anything else you want to say about this before.

MR. KELLY: In our brief we address that issue about machine guns --

THE COURT: Okay.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. KELLY: -- and as I said, the machine guns are not protected because they're dangerous and unusual weapons and certainly were not in common use in any way, shape or form either in the 1920s or in the Founding Era, so --. And the examples of dangerous and unusual weapons are M16s which in fact shoot automatically, machine guns, regulation on sawed-off shotguns, hand grenades. And the sawed-off shotguns, as I understand it, was intended to prevent people from carrying those around under their jacket. There were also carry permit laws in -- at the time, but they focused on little carry guns that could be concealed so people couldn't see them. And you have bump stocks, which a bump stock turns a semi-automatic basically

into an automatic. So the rationale for that is that as a result of them being able to fire continuously, they were determined to be dangerous and unusual, and dangerous and unusual firearms are not protected by the Second Amendment; and the courts have unanimously upheld that based upon that holding that in fact they're dangerous and unusual. The common use standard was applied to be a standard, to be the large-capacity magazines, and the New York State Rifle case v. Cuomo went to the Second Circuit and that's the basis for that, your Honor.

Now I've addressed, I believe, the issues of the history. The Second Founding Era, just as we've discussed, although not as important as the Founding Era, the Second Founding Era could give some guidance. In fact, the Defendants cite the Winchester repeater rifle, et cetera, and indicate clearly as an admission there were no regulations restricting Winchester rifles, some of which had 12 capacity, some had 22, et cetera. So even in the Second Founding Era there were no restrictions on capacity. It was the 20s where machine guns, in fact, were considered dangerous and unusual and were regulated. But the *Bruen* case clearly stated that later in time regulations do not affect the historical precedent issue which we've described.

The magazines, I would posit to you, are not dangerous and unusual. And once again, the First Circuit has declined to address whether a standard capacity, large-capacity magazines were commonly used or uncommonly used; however, this court held that stun guns were weapons in common use at that time for lawful purposes for self-defense.

THE COURT: This Court didn't; my colleague Judge Smith did.

MR. KELLY: Yes. I referred to this.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KELLY: And in terms of the number of magazines in existence right now of large capacity, at this point there's about over 20 million ARs owned by individuals in the United States, upwards of 70 million large-capacity magazines for AR-15s; far more than that for the number of other rifles and pistols that have magazines that exceed 10 rounds. And frankly now if one were to take a look at the types of firearms, particularly pistols that are being manufactured with the standard magazine, exceeds 10, there's actually a lot of carry pistols that far exceed 10; they have 12, 15, 17.

THE COURT: Can I ask you, Mr. Kelly, I know you don't believe that the Second Amendment is limited to

arms for purposes of self-defense. Putting that aside for a second, is there any evidence in this record that large-capacity magazines are intended to or have been used for purposes of self-defense, and is it the Plaintiff's position that a gun equipped with a large-capacity magazine is for the purpose of self-defense?

MR. KELLY: Well, I would suggest any firearm you have in your home is, can be used for self-defense. Whether people have large-capacity magazines in those firearms is really I would say somewhat irrelevant to the fact that it's a firearm that can be used for self-defense. Whether it's got 20 rounds or 10 rounds or 12 rounds, all of those can be used for self-defense. And as I said, there's a lot of manufacturers and they've been in existence for a long time that there're pistols, and let's assume for the purpose of discussion which I do not agree with, the large number of handguns now come with a magazine that far exceeds 10 rounds.

THE COURT: But the mere fact that it comes with it doesn't mean it's for the (indecipherable) self-defense. I would imagine people -- I don't know the shooting sport, but I would well imagine people using guns in shooting might, you know, might want the

rapid without reloading ability. Again, I'm just assuming that, but I don't see where it comes around to for purposes of self-defense which, you know, Heller began by saying that, I think Justice Scalia said in Heller that it was for purposes of self-defense in the home and added the in the home part; and then Bruen obviously came forward and took it out of the home but continued with the purposes for personal self-defense. And under your analysis then the language of for self-defense is meaningless, right, because any arm regardless of capacity can be used for self-defense and therefore checks that box; right?

MR. KELLY: Well, I wouldn't say any arm. If it's a dangerous and unusual firearm, no, it can't, because it's not protected. However, I would ask what is the difference between one having an AR with a 20 round or 25 round magazine, and a pistol that has 12, 14, 17 rounds? No one could argue that a pistol is not used or cannot be used for self-defense in the home. I would suggest that's probably that, that shotguns are the most prevalent firearms used for self-defense in the home.

THE COURT: But legislation doesn't prohibit the pistol. I don't think it prohibits the magazine.

MR. KELLY: Right. As we've indicated in our

affidavits, there are many firearms, pistols, that there is no magazine with 10 rounds or less. They don't make them. In fact there's quite a few customers of Ocean State that come in with older guns trying to buy a 10-round magazine and the manufacturers don't make them or the manufacturers aren't in existence anymore, et cetera. So to say that you could use it, just throw in another clip, a magazine into a pistol, that's not true, and none of the evidence indicates that. It's --

THE COURT: But it's also --

MR. KELLY: -- to the contrary.

THE COURT: -- they could make it if there was a market for it, and there could be a market for it if the state limited it. I mean --

MR. KELLY: Well, 80 percent of the states do not regulate the number of rounds in a magazine, so what you can do with those -- and whether there's a market for Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts and a few others, I don't know.

But what I do know from the affidavit we submitted that there are handguns and there are rifles at the present time for which there is no magazine available that complies with this law. It begs the question what does one do with the firearm that they

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

can't get a magazine for? It's worthless. So we would suggest that since the magazine is a crucial part or necessary part of the firearm, whether it's an AR or whether it's a pistol.

Now, this statute does not differentiate between either. It doesn't say that pistols can have a magazine larger than 10, and it doesn't say --

THE COURT: In fact it says the opposite, they can't.

MR. KELLY: That's right, it says they can't have a magazine with more than 10 rounds, and it applies to any firearm. So it is in fact affecting one's right to self-defense with a pistol that has more than 10 rounds, whether it's a pistol or an automatic rifle. And automatic is an oxymoron because they're not, as you know. So I would say just based on that, this affects a core right. So if you don't have a -if you can't get a magazine that complies with the law for whatever firearm, you've been basically dispossessed of your gun and your self-defense. don't think anyone has looked at it that way, but that's the way I think the Court should look at it. Ιt affects the right to self-defense for the reasons I just stated. Now, why is it --

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, your time is just about

up, so if you want to wrap up.

MR. KELLY: Yes.

I would just like to address the takings issue. We cited the cases that clearly said if the government physically takes possession of personal property, even if it's done under the guise of public good, there has to be compensation. Now, as we've indicated in our affidavits, the gun store, Ocean State, they've indicated, (1) they cannot send any of these magazines back to the manufacturer, they will not take them; (2) they cannot sell used magazines for liability reasons, other dealers will not buy used magazines due to the potential liability if it doesn't work right, it's defective, there's a problem with the gun, et cetera.

THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, let's assume that there's a taking -- and I know that's hotly contested and well-briefed -- but I want to jump ahead to the argument of the public safety exception to the takings clause and tell me why this doesn't fall squarely within that.

MR. KELLY: Well, I've just indicated that there are cases. I've just cited a case which stands for the proposition that -- that's the *Tahoe-Sierra Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning* -- that if the government takes possession of personal property, even if disposed in

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the guise of public good, there has to be compensation.

THE COURT: But that's public good, not the public safety exception. The public good, you know, can be them taking over a Walmart to build a rotary in the road. But the public safety exception is specific to public safety.

MR. KELLY: I would say they're one and the The public condition and public safety, I would suggest that they're the same. The public condition, if it's a safety issue you're affecting the public condition, et cetera. So I would -- in the Horne case Justice Holmes noted "A strong public desire to approve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way, regarding condemnation. district court in Duncan held there was a taking, and of course the ban was illegal, and the Ninth Circuit initially upheld the district court on prohibiting the ban, and en banc the Ninth Circuit reversed that, although with all due respect, the Ninth Circuit hasn't seen a gun control law yet that they (indecipherable) upheld.

THE COURT: I'll have you end on that note.

It's brought a smile to my face.

And let's hear from the State. I will say that

1 the briefing by all sides on all of the issues was 2 incredibly helpful and incredibly well done. 3 MR. KELLY: Thank you. 4 THE COURT: I truly appreciate that. MR. KELLY: A lot of reading. 5 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 Do you have your own show-and-tell, Ms. Rice. 8 Ms. Rice? Do I need to pull up my screen? 9 MS. RICE: Not on the screen, thank you. 10 have Mr. Kelly's glasses, which I'm returning to him. And I did want to make care of a little 11 12 housekeeping off the top if I can. Mr. Kelly -- and I 13 apologize for not doing this in the very beginning --14 but Mr. Kelly submitted this morning on the docket an 15 affidavit of Will Worthy at 10:00 a.m. and this comes 16 in well after briefing was due. It is cumulative. 17 THE COURT: I haven't seen it. 18 MS. RICE: Okay. So I thought that that might 19 be the case. I would like to put on the record our 20 objection because it is out of time and cumulative. 21 But in the event that your Honor is inclined to admit 22 it, I have an exhibit that goes to one point in that 23 affidavit that I would like --24 THE COURT: Why don't you do this, Ms. Rice.

Rather than take up your valuable time on the meat of

25

your argument, why don't you put that in a notice or pleading and attach what you would. If I do decide to accept it, attach what you would anyways so we have it all there.

MS. RICE: We'll do that, your Honor. No problem.

THE COURT: Thanks.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. RICE: Good afternoon. As Bruen noted, firearms restrictions are an active response to a particular general societal problem that exists at the time that that regulation was enacted. Today, Rhode Island's large capacity feeding device restriction was enacted in response to mass shootings and gun violence enabled by an unfettered civilian access to weapons and weapons accessories that are most well-suited for war. That problem continues today. Since the State's opposition was filed, there had been numerous incidents involving large capacity magazines. Probably the most notable occurred on October 24th where there was the school shooting in St. Louis, Missouri, that left two killed, four who were shot and injured. Recovered at the scene were over 600 rounds of ammunition and 12 30-round large-capacity magazines. Just up the road in Raleigh --

THE COURT: Can I interrupt you, Ms. Rice.

Didn't Bruen teach us or at least the dissent in Bruen believed that Bruen teaches us that current analysis that the Supreme Court requires doesn't have a place for considering public safety as part of the constitutional analysis. It does on the takings clause, but on the Second Amendment part didn't Bruen wipe that out of what was then the Heller analysis?

MS. RICE: So *Bruen* certainly got rid of the tight nexus of means and scrutiny that evolved in post-*Heller* circuit court precedent, but it did not take away the fact that regulations enacted in response to facts on the ground. That's what history and tradition are made out of.

THE COURT: Right. But if facts on the ground showed that it was dangerous for people to keep a single-shot revolver in their home, *Heller* would strike that down under the Second Amendment. That's not part of the analysis anymore.

The part of the analysis is does the Second Amendment apply, textual analysis; secondly, based on case law that the (indecipherable) I think it's pretty clear as to they're for self-defense, and then if not then you go into the full Second Amendment analysis, right, of historic tradition, however that's going to play out over the years in the analysis that way,

doesn't it? I mean...

MS. RICE: Certainly I agree that there are two steps in scope on the Second Amendment and then we get to history and tradition. It's not unless you get to history and tradition that facts really come into play. But I would submit that even Heller needs to be justified under that historic and tradition analysis that both Bruen and Heller ultimately went through. So when we're talking about the facts, we're looking at societal historic facts. We're looking at are the facts analogous in history to the times that we imposed regulations and --

THE COURT: Can I ask you the same question I asked Mr. Kelly, which is the overriding difficult issue when one has to sit and figure out how one analyzes under this new Supreme Court opinion, which is how are district courts, how am I to deal with competing affidavits that in many instances say the exact opposite? How is this Court based on those affidavits to evaluate the information that each side submits?

MS. RICE: Your Honor, that's certainly a difficult problem, but *Bruen* gives us some hints. It talks about party presentation of the evidence, and I think that our system is prepared to look through party

presentation of the evidence of competing experts. We do it in other contexts all the time. The difference here is that the experts are historians. That is a little bit odd; we don't have a lot of other areas of the law with which I'm familiar where the expert evidence is being presented by historians.

I think there's another danger there, which is that the Court obviously and lawyers are usually pretty interested in history and have some ability, unlike say perhaps soil samples, to do their own digging in the historic record. But that impulse needs to be resisted because this issue, just like any other, needs to be decided through the normal mechanisms of party presentation. And I think our normal mechanisms also answer why it's so difficult now here at preliminary injunction to look at these two sets of competing affidavits. But fortunately we still have our traditional preliminary injunction standard to help us out.

So under the standard for review for preliminary injunction, The Plaintiffs are never awarded injunctive relief as of right, and they're required to make a showing of a strong likelihood of success on the merits. So in the event that the Plaintiffs have not -- there is equipoise between the two evidentiary

records, then the Plaintiffs have not made that strong likelihood of success on the merits and the case can continue on to develop the facts further so that hopefully in the end you wouldn't have balanced competing affidavits.

THE COURT: So let's -- thank you, that was actually helpful to begin to think about this. Let's jump to the first what I'll call preliminary question that I questioned Mr. Kelly about, which is, is a magazine an arm or an accoutrement -- or an accoutrement, depending on who you ask how to pronounce it, or whether you're French or not.

First of all do you think that's, is that an appropriate distinction and, if so, why is a magazine in the State's opinion an accourrement and not an arm? And let me throw in to respond to Mr. Kelly's argument where Justice Thomas said the bullet is part of the arm because without a bullet you can't have a gun.

MS. RICE: Certainly, your Honor, and thank you. So the State does believe that it is extremely relevant whether or not something is an arm or an accourtement, and that's because we've been tasked with *Bruen* to start with the text of the Second Amendment, and the text of the Second Amendment is clear. In *Heller* the court explained that the object of the Second Amendment

is arms. It then went on to look at a number of historic definitions of arms, which are usually weapons of offense or armor or defense, and anything that a man wears for his defense or takes into his hands or uses in wrath to cast out or strike another. So we really have something that can be used to hurt someone.

Now, as to why the State believes that a large-capacity magazine is not an arm, we just saw an example, a very common example of a large-capacity magazine, and when you pick it up, it is not something that you can immediately use to injure somebody else any more than you could a stapler or something that everybody would accept is not an arm.

THE COURT: But doesn't that argument also apply to bullets?

MS. RICE: This is where I think a distinction needs to be made about the burden on the Second Amendment right and the Second Amendment right itself. So the Second Amendment, the scope of the Second Amendment covers arms. You can burden that right by a regulation that might not have as its direct object to arms. You see this in the First Amendment context as well where you get indirect burdens sometimes. So you could have a burden on the Second Amendment by regulating bullets. It would be an indirect burden.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

You could similarly have, say if you did bar magazines entirely perhaps at some point and there was no technical alternative to feeding bullets, then you might have an indirect burden on the right to bear arms, the firearm, the actual weapon itself. But that doesn't mean that the bullet or the large-capacity magazine is in the scope of the Second Amendment, if that makes sense.

THE COURT: It absolutely does. Thank you.

Okay. And I think that's really MR. KELLY: important because we do regulate bullets. Rhode Island has a law that prohibits armor-piercing bullets, for example, so there are times of regulations that the state and federal government have made on various There are other kinds of bullets that have munitions. import restrictions. There are just very many examples where you're going to have this question of like what exactly is a firearm, and it's a complex one. has many, many regulations about what makes up a The federal register is full of discussion about this. I think at the moment it is the lower register of the gun that defines what is and is not a firearm, and so that epistemological question of what is a firearm is complicated.

But I think, here, it's not so complicated. A

large-capacity magazine clearly is not a firearm.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Again, I have no factual knowledge of guns, so you all with more knowledgeable can correct me. But if they did or could manufacture a gun that had a permanent magazine attached into it in excess of 10 rounds, is that prohibited under the Rhode Island statute?

MS. RICE: So the Rhode Island statute has exemptions that would exempt almost all existing firearms or if not all -- we were not, the State was not able to definitively rule out the fact there might be one or two types of firearms that might be in that configuration that you're talking about. But primarily the configuration would be something with an integrated magazine, and we talk about it here, a tubular Those are kind of -- I've been told they're magazine. Boy Scout guns, that they're ones the Boy Scouts use for shooting practice or others use for shooting practice. So those are exempted and not included in Other kinds of guns that generally have that type of an integrated magazines are bolt action shotguns, or perhaps lever actions, something that's not actually semi-automatic. This restriction is two-fold. You have to have a semi-automatic firearm and a large-capacity magazine combined to trigger the

ban on the large-capacity magazine, so if the weapon itself is not semi-automatic then the Large Capacity Feeding Device Ban does not apply. Oftentimes also, it's my understanding that those integrated magazines in other applications don't hold more than 10. So that was what we were able to discover. That's backed up by the affidavit of Mr. Troiano who avers that most firearms would not be in that configuration of an internal magazine.

THE COURT: I think he testified before me once.

MS. RICE: Probably, yes. And these are all extremely helpful questions.

THE COURT: Let's jump to the second, for lack of a better term, preliminary analysis issue, and that is whether the Second Amendment is for the purposes of self-defense, and how do you respond to Mr. Kelly's argument that a shotgun in the home in the bedside stand with, you know, a 15-round magazine in it isn't appropriate for self-defense from an intruder into the home.

MS. RICE: I think it is important to understand why a gun would have a 15-round magazine in it, and that's because of marketing. It's a commercial choice that guns began to be sold with these larger capacity magazines. There is no evidence in this record at all

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that self-defense requires the use of more than 11 bullets, because you can have one in the chamber, and it's been the uniform experience of courts that have considered this matter that they have not found evidence that more than 10 rounds are useful for self-defense. And again, we have the affidavit of Mr. Troiano on that point as well, that even law enforcement officers almost never fire even 10 rounds in offensive cases. And you can look in other cases, other records, and you'll see the same set of evidence. There have been statistical analyses, published studies in medical journals that all come to the same conclusion, and that is that there are very few and sometimes no, depending on what database you're looking at, instances where people successfully use more than 10 rounds in self-defense. There's maybe a handful of incidents that have come up through the decade of litigation on this issue. And it is very clear that the question is whether the proscribed weapons are in common use for lawful purposes like self-defense. That's a direct quote from Worman, our First Circuit case.

THE COURT: How applicable or how controlling is Worman to me now in light of -- I think it was one of those remanded post-Bruen. So just this is purely like

a legal wonky question, but how am I controlled by Worman when it's in that procedural setting.

MS. RICE: Yes, your Honor. I would say that you probably are not probably controlled by Worman at this point, that it is in the process of being vacated. But that doesn't mean that it can't be persuasive, and it also doesn't negate the fact that you can take judicial notice of the many myriad published opinions of factual findings that all courts come to on this issue.

And I think another interesting point that Worman and also Friedman in the Seventh Circuit -- which I do not think was vacated -- make is that this issue of dangerous and unusual really does hinge on the use of for self-defense. It can't be mere numerosity. It can't be the fact that there are just many, many, many of an object that are the controlling test for whether or not it's unusual.

THE COURT: Why wouldn't it be controlling as to the unusual or at least a factor in determining unusual? I understand it's not a factor in the dangerousness part of that, but why wouldn't numerosity be relevant to whether an object is usual or not?

MS. RICE: I wouldn't go so far to say it's not relevant, but it's not controlling, and that's because

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

if it were controlling many of the decisions wouldn't The ban on machine guns, for example, make senses. wouldn't make sense because Tommy guns like were already in widespread use at the time that they were banned; and it doesn't make sense because it gives the legislature the severe perverse incentive to ban all new technology as soon as it comes on the line; and that's kind of what the Seventh Circuit in Worman, their reasoning shows is that it's very difficult to be It's kind of a -- that would mean that consistent. your constitutional rights were at the whim of the marketplace, and there's no other constitutional right that we allow that to happen. So I think that it needs to have very little relevance.

You can also look at the numbers at issue in Caetano and the numbers at issue in the bump stock ban. So we have Plaintiffs who --

THE COURT: I'm trying to get my head my around what a bump stock is, but you don't have to go into it. It's not a clear definition of bump stock when one does a peripheral look at the internet to see that's what it means.

MS. RICE: I just think that that's true, that's one of the things about gun regulation is that because we're talking about kind of a mechanical object there

are many different ways that you can modify it and therefore it's hard to define; you get back to this sort of philosophical epistemological what is a gun issue. But for -- in terms of looking at Tasers, it was around 200 to 300,000 is what Justice Alito cited to as being in common use for self-defense, whereas bump stocks was many more hundreds of thousands for that. And Plaintiffs even concede that bump stocks probably are permissibly regulated under the Second Amendment. So it can't turn on the actual number in circulation.

And the State has offered a theory about how we can think about dangerous and unusual, and that is how is the weapon used in its social context. And you see this in regulations that *Bruen* held up as probably constitutional, like concealed carry. If you look at the history of open carry and concealed carry, and you look at *Bruen* analysis of those laws you see that *Bruen* notes when the statute of North Hampton was enacted there was societal unrest. When concealed carry was prohibited of pistols in East New Jersey was prohibited, that was a reaction to societal unrest. And that pattern marches on through Reconstruction into Post-Reconstruction into the regulation of semi-automatic weapons by capacity, which started in

1927. So for each of those time periods you see that societal unrest and some perception that there was an imbalance or unfairness in people's ability to defend themselves because of the excessive fire power, there's regulation to curtail the use of those kinds of weapons. And that's exactly what we have here today is the curtailment of use of automatic, semi-automatic weapons that we know are constitutional from *Heller* by limiting the capacity of those weapons through this regulation.

It's only if the Court finds that these large-capacity magazines are in fact arms, and if the Court finds that they are not dangerous and unusual that we get down to the *Bruen* text and history analysis. And it is there that a closer read of the relevant history and tradition is required. But there is no need to find a dead ringer analogue for the regulation. You don't need to find an historic regulation that banned capacity of firearms in the Founding Era, and in fact it would -- -

THE COURT: Says who?

MS. RICE: Says *Bruen*. That specifically said that we need a well-established and representative historical analogue, not an historical twin and said that you would not necessarily find a dead ringer;

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

instead we analogize the how and the why and find the comparable burden and comparable justification.

And this is why you're not going to find in the Founding Era a limit on capacity. We talked a little bit about the content of the affidavits on what kinds of firearms existed at the Founding, and I would submit that what kinds of firearms that existed at the Founding isn't in real factual dispute here, but what is disputed is what does the existence of each of those firearms mean in terms of if there was an experimental idea for a gun or a prototype, one of which survives in the Smithsonian, does that have relevance to the absence of regulation, and we would submit that it does There was no widespread use. We don't have not. evidence of wide-spread use from Ms. Hlebinsky's We have one instance in which the Giardoni affidavit. air rifle was used. If you look at the sources, you see that the Lewis and Clark Expedition only used that rifle in the broadest sense. They brought it as an example of European technology to show it off.

And, you know, we know this also from our general knowledge of history, but in our affidavits we talk about how at the time most people had black powder weapons, and these weapons themselves are black powder weapons; very difficult to load, you couldn't keep them

loaded in your home. They were very rarely used. Even when people committed murder they were only used in about 10 or 15 percent of murders, any gun, any firearm. So we didn't have this problem of widespread gun violence or murder by guns. And it turns out too that around the Founding there was a period of relative social harmony at least in the North, so it's another reason why you're not going to find historical analogues from that time.

When you do start to see historic analogues is when you have a period of societal unrest, and there are in fact technological advances that show this difference in firepower that we've been talking about, and that's during Reconstruction. There is some I think tension between the two affidavits here as well, but most of that can be explained if you drill down on the time period.

So we know that immediately prior to Reconstruction and during the Civil War and immediately prior to the Civil War, there were many racist gun restrictions enacted in slave holding states; but these are not gun restrictions to which we ask the Court to analogize? Everyone agree or -- we agree and that those restrictions are not appropriate analogues. Instead, we look at the actual history of

Reconstruction. That's after the Civil War is over, when the Fourteenth Amendment is being ratified by the states, and when the United States Army is working very hard to protect these new-found and hard-won rights for Black Americans; and it's that period of time that we have shown that there is a regulation of these guns through enforcement, that the state militias, the Army worked very hard to keep these larger capacity more powerful weaponry out of the hands of the insurrectionists. They intercepted shipments. They made sure that these guns were not going to the KKK.

THE COURT: Is enforcement equal in our analysis of historic tradition with regulation and statute?

MS. RICE: I would say that regulations and statute do not have to be just the written regulations and the written statutes. The court looked very closely at the common law when it talked about the history of regulation in both *Bruen* and *Heller*, and the common law is in part made up of enforcement. At the time -- and this is still history that is being uncovered and researched. As we speak people are starting to unearth the court records, things like grand jury records and other arrest records as kind of we are looking; it's newly relevant history that people have not necessarily done before.

But yes, this enforcement at the time, we're talking about a period of extreme societal unrest and it can happen. It explains kind of how are these weapons treated at the time, who had access to them and why, and only certain limited populations, mostly law enforcement, had access to the weapons. And why, because they were viewed as dangerous and unusual at the time and so there was concerted action by the government to restrict them.

We don't talk about the First Amendment only in terms of published regulation or published law. We look to see how governments actually treat speakers before them as well. So I would think that, yes, enforcement would also be a good source.

So we do have -- Dr. Vorenberg's affidavit goes into a lot of detail on this, which I could never hope to repeat here so I will not attempt to do that.

THE COURT: I was actually fascinated by it as an historic piece.

MS. RICE: Yes, / so, but that was --

THE COURT: I'm not saying like it's relevant to the analysis. I'm not saying...

MS. RICE: Understood, your Honor, yes. But we do believe that that is relevant to the analysis and we do believe that it's important to note that all of that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

enforcement action was being taken in defense of Black Americans' right to arms self-defense. Black Americans at the time for the first time were getting access to Second Amendment rights, and those rights were vindicated with weapons that were less powerful than the Henrys and the Winchesters at the time.

Of course technology keeps going, so, you know, shortly thereafter we're going to get to a period of time where there are more powerful weapons than the Henrys and the Winchesters when semi-automatics come on the scene, because those rifles were bolt action, so they were not semi-automatic, and so if anyone has one hanging around today they wouldn't be covered by the large-capacity magazine ban. But at the time they were dangerous and unusual. As throughout history dangerous and unusual weapons were regulated, they were regulated, and when they were displaced with even more powerful weapons, those weapons were also regulated first in the hunting context and then in bans that 13 states passed between 1927 and 1934, and then the federal government began to ban machine guns. see that arc repeating itself.

I think one other thing that I wanted to address was the issue of whether sporting could be a part of the Second Amendment right. It is, of course, the

State's position that we know from Heller and we know from Bruen that that's not the case; that's self-defense. There was a Seventh Circuit case, Ezell, that we do cite to in our briefing that made some reference to a corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in the use of weapons, but there's nothing about the large-capacity magazine ban that would implicate that in any event because you can take your firearm that you own to the gun range and fire any number of bullets to your satisfaction and go home and watch the football game. That's all permitted under this regulation.

THE COURT: So when one looks perhaps only in the takings analysis, but when one looks at the public safety aspect of this ban, the benefit to the public that supports it is really pause a moment; right?

MS. RICE: Yes.

THE COURT: And the amount of time it takes for a shooter to switch magazines, ending one, starting another, is the benefit of this ban; right?

MS. RICE: That's the benefit of the ban. And I think you can see that discussed at length in the en banc opinion in Colgate which really gets into the detail of all of the events that have happened where a chance would have helped. So the Newtown report

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

demonstrates that. There's evidence from the Las Vegas shooting that people ran for cover during pauses in magazine changes. And that was a shooter who was very skilled, had a lot of ability.

THE COURT: What do you say to Mr. Kelly's argument that the marksmen or, you know, marksmen oftentimes within a second or two can change the magazine. What is the public benefit there?

MS. RICE: Sure. Two things. A second or two could really mean the difference between someone being able to take an action -- run, flee, hide -- and not, because not all people involved in the incident are going to be targeted at the same time. Second, that public policy is imperfect. The court recognizes that, you know, in Jacobson, as long ago as that, we kind of realize that legislatures have to be free to legislate for public safety, that when constitutional rights aren't in place, so like if we're not infringing on the Second Amendment right we only need to come up with the rational basis. We only need to show that there's some conceivable connection so that we can experiment and bring, bear out that federalistic experiment that the Founders envisioned. And I think that that's very There are a limited tools, and rightly so. important. That's the structure of our government. The government

in the United States is limited. So what the government can do to protect public safety within those tools, they need the full span, and whether or not it's actually successful is exactly the analysis that *Bruen* told us we could no longer look at. That nexus between means and ends is no longer relevant to the Second Amendment.

THE COURT: Let's jump into the takings, and can you, using Ocean State Tactical in particular, who Mr. Kelly represents, has an inventory of, if the injunction doesn't go forward is useless supplies that the government through its regulation has determined from a profitable expect to a zero sum aspect for them. How is that not a taking?

MS. RICE: Sure. So there's kind of two points there. The first is that the public safety exception does apply.

THE COURT: I realize that maybe I shouldn't have said exception because it's not really an exception; it's a definition of taking. But get at the -- putting that aside for a second, why isn't that a Fifth Amendment taking?

MS. RICE: Sure. So we're, again, not talking about a seizure, which is very important in the analysis. There's a different standard that applies.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Here -- and it's a full economic taking, taking of all the economic value when you're talking about personal property as regulatory, it's not a seizure of property.

And here, there's residual economic value that is still available. Even if there's no market, there is the ability retained in the law for Ocean State Tactical to sell this excess inventory out of state. Ocean State Tactical can take that capital asset and modify it themselves. So they have the ability to sell out of state already because of they're a federally-licensed firearm dealer. And again, we're here on an injunction, and Ocean State Tactical has not put in any evidence that this is an existential threat to their business. The evidence that they put in about revenue just was not enough to get them over that threshold, and so an injunction is not warranted under the standard because it's fully remediable by monetary damages at the end of the case.

THE COURT: Or irreparable harm.

MS. RICE: And you wouldn't be alone if you found that this kind of a law left residual value. That's exactly what the Third Circuit found in the Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. The Attorney General of New Jersey. And there was another district court in California, Weise, that found that a

similar ban was not a taking, not on the public safety rationale, which is what *Bonta* found, but on this other issue. And in fact that's also -- I think that that was the grounds for *Fesjian*, which is the machine gun takings case as well.

THE COURT: Am I bound by the legislature's finding of public safety in promulgating this regulation when one analyzes the takings aspect of this? In other words do I accept the fact that the policymaking arm of government, the legislature, determined that it was a public safety reason for its passage and ergo not a taking? Or is mine an independent analysis that I look outside of that for determination?

MS. RICE: I do think that it would be --

THE COURT: There's language somewhere, I forget where it's from, I don't know if it was from -- it was from some of the takings cases that you all cited where it seemed to imply great deference if not almost adherence to the policymaking branches for that determination.

MS. RICE: Yes, I think that's right that great deference is owed. That is the standard. Let's see.

Yes, so I mean that is the standard all the way back to 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas that --

THE COURT: Excellent.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. RICE: -- that are declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community cannot in any just sense be deemed a taking.

THE COURT: That was exactly the quote I was thinking of because it says as determined by the legislature.

MS. RICE: By the legislature. So I think that that is definitely where you're starting from. think about it. This happens kind of with fair frequency of probably -- and *Duncan* spoken about this. Every time a new drug is manufactured, like we get a designer on the scene and it's added to the schedule, there's a period of, there's a lag period between the time the drug is invented, like synthetic marijuana, and the time that it is added to the Controlled Substances Act Schedule; and in between that time people lawfully possess that substance, that chemical, and automatically when that is added it's contraband. People are not entitled to a taking for the loss of their property in those banned chemicals. So this happens quite often. It's not really an unusual event that the legislature would deem something to be injurious to the public.

THE COURT: Is there any evidence that you know of that the legislature considered compensating folks like Ocean State Tactical and perhaps citizens for the value of the illegal magazines?

MS. RICE: The only legislative history that I know of -- and we did examine this in coming up with our arguments here -- is the hearing at which the Chief of Police for the Providence Police Department testified, so that is linked in our briefing.

THE COURT: I read it. Colonel Clements' testimony.

MS. RICE: Yes. And other people testified at that time in the committee. But there is no other (indecipherable) legislative history. The Rhode Island General Assembly does not keep written records of that.

THE COURT: Probably a good thing.

MS. RICE: At least a good thing for those whose job it is to keep voluminous records.

THE COURT: Ms. Rice, why don't you wrap up.

MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor.

So as you can see from this argument, these are very important and pressing issues of public importance balancing the Second Amendment rights that people have to defend themselves with firearms, with reasonable public safety measures that protect us all from those

lone actors and criminals that would seek to abuse those rights. And we submit we think there's a lot of evidence here that this kind of restriction on an accessory is a way to make that balance appropriately, and we would urge you therefore to deny the preliminary

THE COURT: Thanks. Well, I'm not going to do either at this time. I'm going to get you a decision as soon as I can; hopefully before the statute requires the alleged taking part to go into effect. We'll act as quickly as we can.

injunction at this time.

Mr. Kelly, do you want your -- I don't see any reason to keep this (gesturing).

MR. KELLY: If I could have one minute to reply to some of the questions you asked me.

THE COURT: No. As I said, everything was briefed very well, and I promised my staff I would limit it.

MR. KELLY: Would it be possible to file just a short 10-page supplement to address some of the issues you raised?

THE COURT: You are always welcome to request further brief, sure.

MR. KELLY: Would you like me to do that by motion, your Honor, or...

THE COURT: I would like you to; unless the 1 2 State wants to allow short supplemental. 3 MS. RICE: We would not agree to that. 4 Why don't you do it by motion, THE COURT: 5 Mr. Kelly. Do a motion with it attached. 6 MR. KELLY: Thank you. 7 THE COURT: Thanks. Again, I couldn't be 8 prouder to be a member of this Bar with the advocacy that's taking place by both sides. It was outstanding. 9 10 I tell everyone that sometimes that makes my job 11 easier, but more often than not like this it makes my 12 job a heck of a lot harder, so thank you to all 13 counsel. 14 MR. KELLY: Thank you, your Honor. 15 MS. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. 16 (Adjourned) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION I, Denise P. Veitch, RPR, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in the above-entitled case. /s/ Denise P. Veitch\_ Denise P. Veitch, RPR Federal Official Court Reporter January 6, 2023 Date